this would be equivalent to those people’s saying:

“To judge it impossible for a being to exist neither within the world nor outside it is a judgment of the estimative faculty.”

For they have said: “This is judging what is not perceptible by the senses according to judgments applicable to what is perceptible.” If there is nothing in existence that cannot be perceived by the senses, their assertion is false. But if something exists that cannot be perceived by the senses, and these people claim that He is infinite in every direction—and, according to some of them, is not a body, while according to others He is a body—then judging that He would mingle with the world and that this is impossible for Him would be judging what is not perceptible by the senses according to judgments applicable to what is perceptible. They do not accept such a judgment.

Moreover, the argument here is from the standpoint of those who say that He can be pointed to and that He is finite, whether they also hold that He is a body or that He is not a body.

If these people say, “Everything that can be pointed to is a body,” this is equivalent to their saying, “If He were above the Throne, He could be pointed to and would be a body.” Various groups have disputed this with them.

It has been shown that the assertion, “He is above the Throne and is not a body,” is no more contrary to reason than the assertion, “He is neither within the world nor outside it at all.” For the latter is closer to nonexistence than the former, and the closer anything is to nonexistence, the further it is from necessary existence.

Likewise, if someone says, “He can be pointed to and is infinite, yet does not mingle with things—or He does mingle with them, but there is no deficiency in that,” his assertion is no more contrary to reason than theirs. Rather, an equivalent to their assertion would be to say, “He is everywhere in His essence, cannot be pointed to, and has no limit,” as some of them have said.