hence His restriction to that specified magnitude. Moreover, if He were finite on every side, He would not be above all existing things, because there would be places above Him devoid of Him, which the opponent denies.”

[Responses to this argument: The first response]

The position of those who say:

“He is above the Throne, but is described neither as finite nor as infinite, since neither description applies to Him.”

This is the position of those mentioned earlier who say: “He is above the Throne, but is not described as having a magnitude.” This view is held by some scholars of speculative theology, jurisprudence, hadith, and Sufism among the Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, and Ash‘ariyyah, and by those who agree with them among the followers of the imams, including adherents of Ahmad, Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, and others.

When those who deny the attributes tell them, “This is impossible according to self-evident reason,” they reply:

“To affirm an existent being that cannot be pointed to and cannot be described as either finite or infinite, or as either within the world or outside it, is more manifestly untenable according to self-evident reason. For if we present reason with two conceptions—an existent being outside the world and separate from it, to whom neither finitude nor its absence is attributed; and an existent being neither inside the world nor outside it, neither separate from it nor occupying the same place as it, neither finite nor infinite—the second is more manifestly untenable to reason, as in the analogous case discussed earlier.”

[The second response]

The position of those who say:

“He is infinite, either on one side,