to nonexistent things and inanimate objects. Anything that possesses none of the attributes of perfection—having, necessarily, life, but no knowledge, power, speech, action, greatness, or mercy, and being instead an unqualified or abstract existent—would be impossible to exist, not necessarily existent.

Whatever can only be perfect cannot exist without its perfection. Whatever must be living, knowing, and powerful cannot exist without its life, power, and knowledge. The fact that the attributes of perfection necessarily belong to Him, and that He necessarily entails them, does not mean that He cannot exist in virtue of Himself.

Calling this a “part,” a “portion,” or the like amounts, at most, to saying that the whole cannot exist without its part. It is evident that the whole cannot exist without the whole; thus, the whole exists through the whole, and this does not imply its dependence upon anything other than itself. If saying that He depends upon Himself or His whole does not undermine His necessary existence, then saying that He depends upon His attribute or His part is all the more insufficient to undermine His necessary existence.

This is further clarified by the fact that these philosophers say that His existence entails the existence of contingent effects. Thus, His existence cannot be conceived without the existence of contingent, caused beings separate from Him. In their view, this does not undermine His necessary existence in virtue of Himself. How, then, could His necessarily entailing attributes of perfection that belong inseparably to Him and subsist in Him undermine His necessary existence? If His necessarily entailing something other than Himself constitutes dependence upon it, then His dependence upon His effect