its part, which is other than itself, and because whatever depends on something other than itself is intrinsically contingent.

It is well known that this argument has been shown at length to be unsound in several places. It has also been shown to rest on ambiguous, equivocal expressions. This argument is the foundation of the philosophers’ conception of divine oneness.

Muslim rational theologians have demonstrated its unsoundness, as Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī and others have done.

[Al-Rāzī’s reply in Nihāyat al-Maʿqūl to the argument from composition concerning the attributes]

Al-Rāzī answered the philosophers’ argument from composition concerning the attributes, saying in Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl:

“His statement: ‘Affirming the attributes entails multiplicity within the divine reality, which would therefore be contingent.’

“We reply: If you mean that this reality would need an external cause, that does not follow, since these attributes may depend upon the essence whose existence is intrinsically necessary. If you mean that the attributes depend for their existence upon that particular essence, then this is something he accepts. Where, then, is the impossibility? Moreover, according to you, relations are attributes that exist outside the mind. You are therefore subject to the same objection you raised against us concerning the attributes, and likewise concerning the forms of intelligibles imprinted in His essence.”

He also said:

“What confirms the unsoundness of the philosophers’ position is that they said: ‘Allah