Similarly, if he means by this that it is composed of matter and form, as some philosophers maintain, most rational people deny this. The correct position is that of those who deny it, as explained elsewhere. Even supposing it is granted, whoever grants it disputes the validity of the second premise and rejects the claim that the necessary consequence is absent.

If you intend the third meaning—that one thing within it is distinguishable from another—you should be told: this conclusion is inescapable for everyone.

Those who affirm the divine attributes affirm knowledge, power, will, and speech. It is known that these qualities are distinct in themselves: none is identical to another. Others recognize the difference between His being knowing, His being powerful, His being living, and so forth.

The philosophers recognize the difference between His being existent and His being necessary, between His being one who thinks and His being intellect itself, between His being a lover and His being love, and between His being a source of pleasure and His experiencing pleasure, and so forth. In short, the implication of such multiple, manifold qualities is inescapable for everyone. This is the question of the attributes.

If those who deny the attributes say, “In our view, knowledge is will, will is power, necessity is existence,” and so forth, they can be answered in two ways.

The first is to say: this is necessarily known to be false, as explained above. No rational person doubts the falsity of such a claim once he has understood it.

The second is to say: if you are permitted to affirm multiple qualities that differ in their properties, implications, and names—where the difference between them is not one of generality and specificity, as with colour and blackness—and to say that they involve no multiplicity, plurality, or division, then it would be permissible