so his position is closer to agreement between revelation and reason, and closer to revelation considered on its own. It is therefore preferable to their position on every supposition.

This is also how Muslims regard the matter: the Kullābīs, Karrāmīs, and Ash'arīs are closer to the Sunnah and the truth than the Jahmīs among the philosophers and the Mu'tazilah, and others like them, according to the agreement of the great majority of Muslims and their general populace.

[The Second Argument]

He should be asked:

“What do you mean when you say that everything that can be pointed to must either be divisible or indivisible? By divisibility, do you mean that it can be separated, broken up, and divided into parts? Or do you mean that anything that can be pointed to, unless it is the size of an indivisible atom, must be composed of indivisible atoms? Or do you mean that one part of it can be pointed to rather than another, that one part can be seen rather than another, and that one part can be distinguished from another?”

If you mean the first, then, concerning the implication of the first supposition: it does not follow from a thing’s inability to be separated, broken into parts, or divided that it must be as small as an indivisible atom. For we know by necessity that a thing may be large and immense while being incapable of separation, partition, or division.

Indeed, people have disputed whether many created things admit of separation. Those who affirm that they do establish this by proof; they do not say that it is known by necessity.