such as the Tamīmīs, Judge Abū Ya‘lā, and his followers, including Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others—and as is also maintained by some philosophers, as Ibn Rushd reported from the sages, some of whose statements have already been cited.

Those who hold this view are very numerous. They say:
“We do not concede that if He is indivisible, He must be an indivisible atom.”

They also say:
“We do not concede that He must be larger than the Throne, smaller than it, or equal to it. These three alternatives follow only if He is a spatially situated body with defined limits. If He is above the Throne but is not a body of determinate magnitude and limits, none of these alternatives necessarily follows, even though He can be pointed to.”

If those who deny this say:
“The invalidity of this is self-evident. We know self-evidently that whatever is above something else must be larger than it, smaller than it, or equal to it in size. We also know that one side of it is distinguishable from another, and this is precisely divisibility.”

Those who affirm it reply:
“To admit this possibility is more reasonable than to admit the existence of a being that is neither inside the world nor outside it and cannot be pointed to, or the existence of two beings neither of which is spatially coincident with the other nor separate from it.

“You say that judging something to be larger than another, smaller than it, or equal to it, or to be separate from it, spatially coincident with it, capable of being pointed to, and so forth, belongs to the judgments of the estimative faculty, which depends on sense perception.

“You also say that the judgments of the estimative faculty are not acceptable outside sensory matters, and you claim that discussion of the attributes of the Lord, Most High, falls into this category.”

It may therefore be said to you:
“If judgments of this kind are not acceptable, neither is your judgment