Likewise, the mind’s supposition that a thing either shares a location with another, is separate from it, or neither shares a location with it nor is separate from it does not establish that each of these alternatives is possible in external reality.

[The second response]

It may be said:

These people do not say, “It either pervades the other or is separate from it.” Rather, they say, “It either is separate from the other or shares its location”—that is, it is where the other is, whether one pervades the other as an attribute pervades its subject, or both pervade a single subject, like life and power subsisting in a single subject.

Accordingly, it is not conceded that reason hesitates to rule out the third alternative. For someone who says, “I know of necessity that two existing things must either be separate from one another or share a location,” is certain that there cannot be an existing thing that neither is separate from the other existing thing nor shares its location.

[The third response]

It may be said:

Regarding the third alternative, he says either that it is possible in the mind or that it is possible in external reality. Mental possibility means not knowing that something is impossible, whereas the latter means knowing that it is possible in external reality.

He has explained that he means the former: the absence of knowledge until a proof is established.

It may then be said:

Mere mental possibility—which is the absence of knowledge of impossibility—does not establish possibility in external reality or knowledge of that possibility. At most, he can say, “I know neither whether it is possible nor whether it is impossible.”

The person making the claim, however, says, “I know of necessity that it is impossible.” We have already mentioned that they are distinct groups who have agreed on this without coordinating with one another. This entails that they are truthful in what they report about their innate natures.