[The fourth argument]

It may be said:

The assertion that estimation, imagination, the faculty of sight and the other faculties, passionate love, embarrassment, apprehension, anger, and courage do not fall within the scope of sense perception, estimation, or imagination can mean either that a human being cannot perceive these things through the senses, or that sensory perception of them is altogether impossible.

If the first meaning is intended, this provides no proof. If the second is intended, the opponent would dispute it, saying: “Rather, these things can be perceived through the senses,” and would demand proof that such perception is impossible.

[The fifth argument]

It may be said:

A person’s judgment that these accidents and faculties, or the soul that bears them, cannot conceivably be perceived through the senses is weaker than his judgment that, of any two existing entities, one must either be spatially separate from the other or share its location; that every independently subsisting entity can be pointed to; and similar judgments.

Indeed, if a rational person consults his natural disposition and is asked, “Is it possible for Allah to create in a human being a faculty by which he can perceive—whether by sight, touch, or otherwise—the faculties and accidents within another person, and their locus?” and is also asked to consider, in light of that disposition, the existence of an entity neither inside nor outside the world, his certainty that the latter is impossible would be stronger than his certainty that the former is impossible.

If that is so, one cannot be certain that the former is impossible and then use its impossibility as proof that the latter is possible.