by estimation and imagination the internal spirit within the brain in which these faculties subsist, or some other body, then it is well known that this has shape and form just as other bodies do.

If, however, they subsist in these bodies, they have the same status as comparable accidents subsisting in bodies.

On either supposition, this does not establish the possibility of an existent that is neither a body nor something subsisting in a body, let alone establish the existence of something that is not in any direction and cannot be pointed to.

The same applies to the faculties involved in shame, apprehension, and all other accidents of the soul.

If he says:

“In my view, these accidents subsist in the rational soul, which is neither a body nor a faculty within a body. It cannot be pointed to and is neither inside nor outside the heavens and the earth. It neither ascends nor descends, neither moves nor remains at rest.”

He may be told:

This is not true of imagination, estimation, and similar faculties whose locus is known to subsist in itself and to be a body.

It may then be said:

If what you say about the rational soul is established, it would constitute evidence for an existent that cannot be pointed to. If it is not established, your mere assertion provides no evidence for an independently subsisting existent that cannot be pointed to. Your opponent would say to you:

“In my view, all these accidents can be pointed to by pointing to their locus, just as other accidents are pointed to. They can also be perceived by the senses, even though I do not perceive them now, just as I do not perceive some of the internal and external parts of my body.”