faculties are among the internal accidents in the human being, as are passionate love, shame, apprehension, and similar states.

It is well known that no one has claimed that every accident has a form and shape. The most that anyone making such a claim would say is that it applies to a body that subsists in itself, not to an accident. Indeed, even manifest, observable accidents—such as colors, motions, tastes, and smells—have no independently subsisting form or shape of their own. How much less, then, do internal accidents!

If he says:

“Rather, these do have form and shape: either by reference to their locus, their form and shape corresponding to the body in which they subsist, or by attributing form and shape to the accident itself that subsists in the body.”

It may be replied:

The same can be said of internal accidents subsisting within the human being, such as his internal sensation, internal movement, estimation, and imagination subsisting in his brain and soul, and the like. These are accidents subsisting in some part of the human body, in his spirit—which is the rational soul—or in both. Their substrate is a body possessing shape and form, so they have shape and form of the same kind as those of taste, color, and motions.

[The second response]

These things either subsist in themselves or subsist in something else.

If he says, “They subsist in themselves,” as, for example, when he means