[Section: The third argument in al-Rāzī’s al-Arbaʿīn]

As for the third argument, he says:

“The faculties of imagination and estimation cannot conceive a form and shape for themselves, nor for the faculty of sight and the other faculties.”

[Ibn Sīnā’s discussion in al-Ishārāt]

This argument is of the same kind as Ibn Sīnā’s argument on this matter. In the second argument in his al-Ishārāt, he says:

“If an existent were such that it fell within the scope of estimation and sense perception, then sense perception and estimation would themselves fall within the scope of sense perception and estimation, and the intellect—which is true judgment—would fall within the scope of estimation.

“Beyond these fundamentals, none of passionate love, shame, apprehension, anger, courage, or cowardice falls within the scope of sense perception and estimation, although they are associated with sensible things. What, then, would you think of existents, if their essences lay beyond the level of sensible things and what is associated with them?”

[Responses to him on several grounds: The first]

It may be said: estimation, imagination, the faculty of sight, and the other