is false. This matter has been discussed at length elsewhere.

The point here is this: these universals are either said to exist externally or are not. If their external existence is not affirmed, they provide no evidence for the possibility of an externally existing entity that cannot be pointed to.

If their external existence is affirmed, it is well known that this is not among the self-evident first principles. Rather, only a group of adherents of Greek logic have maintained it. They contradict themselves on this matter, asserting something and then asserting what contradicts it, while some reject others’ affirmation of it.

That being so, such a proposition cannot properly serve as a premise for refuting a proposition acknowledged by the great majority of peoples, who also acknowledge that it is rooted in their innate dispositions, ingrained in their souls, and inescapable: they cannot rid themselves of it.

Yet a group among them say that it is nevertheless mistaken, because they believe that—even though it is necessary according to their innate disposition—that same disposition accepts premises yielding its opposite. They do not dispute that it is innate and present in souls from the outset; rather, they challenge it through inferential arguments.

Thus, if those who affirm it say to them, “We do not accept challenges to propositions present in the soul from the outset on the basis of propositions reached through reasoning,” or say, “We do not concede the premises by which you argue for the opposite of these propositions, just as we do not concede that universals exist externally, or similar claims,” it becomes clear that their opponent is left without an answer, and that they seek to overturn necessary propositions through merely conjectural and imaginary assertions.