this exists only in the mind, and that the dispute concerns things that exist externally.
His reply is that the purpose is to conceive of something to which reason assigns neither direction nor magnitude, and that this prevents the premise from being self-evident.
[Responses to him: The first response]
Those who affirm maintain only that, of any two externally existing entities, one must be either co-located with or separate from the other. They have not denied the universal knowledge present in the mind. It is well known that the presence of universal knowledge in the mind does not entail the possibility of its existence externally. Since this does not follow, neither does the possibility of an externally existing entity that is neither co-located with nor separate from another.
As for his statement:
“The point is that it is possible to conceive of something to which reason assigns neither direction nor magnitude.”
The response is:
Even assuming this to be correct, it establishes the possibility of conceiving of its existence in the mind; it does not establish that it can pertain to external reality. Thus, there is no evidence for what is in dispute, while what he has established is not what is in dispute.
[The second response]
It may be said:
These universal meanings are universal insofar as they correspond to their individual instances, just as a general expression corresponds to the individuals it encompasses.
As for them in themselves,