has happened among most sects of misguidance. Even so, scarcely any of them returns to his innate disposition, free of personal inclination, without finding that it rejects the existence of a being neither separate from nor co-located with the world. Yet he suppresses his innate disposition through a specious argument, habit, or uncritical imitation, just as a Christian suppresses his innate disposition when it rejects the claim that Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary.

Generally, when any of these people encounters a desperate need that compels him to supplicate Allah, he finds within his heart an impulse directed upward, turning neither right nor left. His innate disposition and immediate awareness acknowledge that Allah is above and reject the existence of a being neither co-located with nor separate from the world. The belief he has adopted through uncritical imitation, habit, or a specious argument contradicts his innate disposition and immediate awareness.

[The fourth argument]

It may be said: This is countered by something even stronger. Great multitudes say that, in times of desperate need, they find within themselves an impulse directed upward as their hearts turn to Allah and supplicate Him. They also say that their reason cannot admit the existence of a being neither inside the world nor outside it, and that they know this by necessity. If it is impossible for a great multitude to agree upon something contrary to self-evident truth, then the argument for affirmation must be valid, and its opposite is therefore false. If such agreement is not impossible, then the deniers’ argument is invalid. Thus, its invalidity is established on either assumption.

[Section: The second argument in al-Rāzī’s discussion in al-Arba‘īn]

As for the second argument, he says that the meaning designated by “human being,” shared by individual people, cannot have a magnitude or spatial location. As for their objection that