religious traditions.

Those who studied the writings of the Muʿtazilah and the Shīʿah, such as Ibn Sīnā and others like him, developed one kind of discourse. Those who associated with the people of the Sunnah and the scholars of hadith, such as Abū al-Barakān and Ibn Rushd, developed another, closer to sound reason and authentic transmitted evidence than Ibn Sīnā’s discourse.

Yet this may escape someone who examines the matter closely and thinks that Ibn Sīnā’s position is closer to reason, just as he thinks that the discourse of the Muʿtazilah and the Shīʿah is closer to reason than that of the Ashʿarīs, the Karrāmīs, and other theologians, or the rational thinkers among the people of the Sunnah and the community.

It is clear—after thorough and exhaustive examination—that the closer someone is to the Sunnah and the way of the prophets, the sounder his discourse on divine matters will be when employing rational methods, just as it will be sounder when employing transmitted evidence. For the indications and proofs of truth support and reinforce one another; they do not contradict or oppose one another.

What Ibn Rushd says concerning the term “place” is tenable for someone who accepts Aristotle’s position that place is the inner surface of the enclosing body in contact with the outer surface of the enclosed body.

It is well known that some people point out that there are other views concerning place. Some say that place is the body upon which another body rests. Others say that place is whatever lies beneath something else, even if that thing does not rest upon it. Still others claim that place is the void, consisting of dimensions.

Disagreement on this subject is of two kinds:

The first is substantive, as when someone claims that there exists a place that is a self-subsisting substance distinct from body. Most rational people deny this.