And when al-Rāzī says, “The philosophers agree,” his knowledge extends only to what appears in the work of Ibn Sīnā and his associates. Likewise, the philosophers whom Abū Hāmid refutes are precisely these men.

There is no doubt that, in matters of theology, as in matters of prophethood, Aristotle and his followers have little of substance to say. As for prophethood, no discussion of it by him is known; as for theology, his discussion is very limited. Most of his discourse concerns natural philosophy and mathematics. They also discuss spiritual beings in much the same manner as sorcerers and polytheists.

Their discussion of the Necessary Being Himself is very limited, besides containing errors. They do not call Him the Necessary Being, nor do they divide existence into necessary and contingent; this was introduced by Ibn Sīnā and his followers. Rather, they call Him the First Mover and the First Cause. Their views have been set out at length elsewhere.

For them, metaphysics is the discipline that examines existence and its concomitants. These are universal, general, unrestricted concepts encompassing the Necessary Being and other beings. Some of their discussion of these matters is erroneous and some is correct, but most of it consists of classifying the genera of substances and accidents.

Thus, they fell into two types: speculative thinkers who classify universals, and those who cultivate themselves through worship and asceticism according to their own principles—or who combine both approaches, such as al-Suhrawardī and the slain one, the followers of Ibn Sab‘īn, and others.