this issue—and others like it—to concede that colours may be heard and that sounds may not be heard. All this departs from nature and from what the human mind can comprehend. For it is evident that sight is distinct from hearing, that the objects perceived by one are distinct from those perceived by the other, and that the organ of one is distinct from that of the other. Sight cannot turn into hearing, just as colour cannot become sound.

Those who say that sound may at some time be seen must be asked: ‘What is sight?’ They must answer: ‘It is a faculty by which visible things—colours and other things—are perceived.’ Then they should be asked: ‘What is hearing?’ They must answer: ‘It is a faculty by which sounds are perceived.’

Once they have granted this, they should be asked: ‘When sight perceives sounds, is it sight alone or hearing alone?’ If they say, ‘Hearing alone,’ they have conceded that it does not perceive colours. If they say, ‘Sight alone,’ then it does not perceive sounds. If it is not sight alone, because it perceives sounds, nor [hearing] alone, because it perceives colours, then it is both sight and hearing.

On this basis, all things would be one and the same, even opposites. This, I believe, is something the theologians of our religion concede, or are bound to concede—meaning these Ash'arīs.”