so the writing corresponds to the expression, and the expression corresponds to the meaning. Each of the three encompasses the concrete entities existing in external reality, extending to and including them all. This does not mean that something in external reality itself encompasses this and that, exists in both, or is shared by both. No one who understands what he is saying would make such a claim. It is made only by someone who confuses mental concepts with external realities, or who follows someone who has erred in this matter.

Whoever understands this will recognize much of the error that has entered logic through their discussions of universals and particulars. Examples include the five universals—genus, differentia, species, property, and common accident—as well as the distinction they draw between essential attributes and the necessary concomitants of an essence. They claim that species are composed of shared and distinguishing essential attributes, which they call genus and differentia; they call these attributes parts of the essence; and they claim that these attributes, which they call parts, precede the thing possessing them in both mental and external existence. They also posit, within concrete entities existing in external reality, an intelligible reality distinct from the particular thing that exists. These and similar errors lead those who follow them into error concerning divine matters.

They may thus come to believe that the Necessary Existent is absolute existence subject to the condition of absoluteness, as a group of heretics have maintained, or subject to the condition that all positive features be negated, as Ibn Sīnā and others like him have maintained. Yet clear reason establishes that what is absolute, subject either to the condition of absoluteness or to the negation of positive features, cannot exist in external reality. Thus, the Necessary Existent becomes an impossible existent.