reported something that the other group declared false, and the combined effect of their reports was that the wealth was taken. They did not report a single proposition warranting the taking of the wealth; rather, it is possible that all of them were lying.

The same applies to those who agree in rejecting some of what the Messenger (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) conveyed and what is self-evidently known to reason: their agreement may arise in this manner. This resembles the unbelievers’ shared rejection of the Messenger (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), with some saying, “He is a sorcerer,” others, “He is a liar,” and others, “He is mad.” In reality, they disagree rather than agree.

Furthermore, a large number of people may agree to lie deliberately, knowing that it is a lie, if they have colluded. As for a great many people agreeing upon a falsehood through error, this is possible in matters of reasoning and self-evident truths. Such truths may be expressed in ambiguous and equivocal language whose meaning many people suppose does not contradict self-evident knowledge. Only someone who distinguishes its various meanings and separates the meaning that contradicts self-evident knowledge from the others recognizes that contradiction. If a small number of people have been the first to adopt an erroneous belief that entails contradicting self-evident knowledge, all rational people agree that this is possible. A small group may deliberately engage in sophistry, so how much more readily might they fall into it through error?

If others then receive those statements from the people who first advanced them, and the statements become widespread among their followers, they come to agree in accepting them because of their ambiguity and lack of clarity, despite their entailing a contradiction of self-evident knowledge—even though many, or most, of those who profess them are unaware of this. This is the reason for the agreement of