the act itself, then it must come after him. Thus, on either supposition, the effect must come after its agent. If, however, his act may coexist with him, then an infinite succession is either possible or impossible. If it is impossible, temporally originated events must have a beginning. In that case, even if the act coexisting with its agent is beginningless, this does not undermine the necessity that its effects be temporally originated.

This is the position of those who say that He brings temporally originated events into being through a beginningless, eternal act of creation subsisting in His essence, as various groups of Muslims maintain. If an infinite succession is possible, another act may follow that act, and another may follow it, and so on; and these celestial spheres may have come into being thereafter, as the scriptural texts have related. This is what was to be proved.

Al-Abharī and others objected to this premise when discussing the argument of those who sought to prove that the world is temporally originated on the grounds that it is contingent and that everything contingent is temporally originated. Their reasoning was that its cause must either act upon it while it exists—which is invalid, since acting upon it while it exists would amount to bringing into existence what already exists and bringing about what has already been brought about, which is impossible—or act upon it while it does not exist, which is also impossible, since this entails combining existence and nonexistence. It must therefore act upon it neither while it exists nor while it does not exist, but at the moment it comes into being.

Al-Abharī and others objected to this by asking: Why could causal influence not occur while the thing exists?

(His statement: “It would amount to bringing about what has already been brought about.”

We reply: “We do not concede this, for causal influence consists in the cause making the existence of its object preponderate over its nonexistence. A contingent being may have its existence preponderate over its nonexistence while it exists.”

Someone challenging his proof can therefore give him the same reply when he says:

“If the act performed by an agent acting by choice were beginningless, the agent would be intending to bring into existence what already exists and to bring about what has already been brought about.”