They also say:
“Inanimate bodies are better than one described by these attributes, let alone imperfect living bodies, let alone perfect living bodies.”

It is well known that when the choice is between a living, perfect body and something nonexistent or impossible in existence, the former is better than the latter. And if this conclusion follows necessarily from premises whose proponents say they are self-evidently known, then it is more firmly established than premises whose proponents say, “You can know them only through reasoning,” while disagreeing over every one of them.

This shows that those who affirm the attributes are more certain of what they say and show greater reverence for what they affirm, whereas those who deny them are closer to conjecture and further removed from reverence and affirmation.

This is clarified by the fact that the principal argument of those who deny the attributes is that, if these attributes—being above and distinct, and the like—were affirmed, it would follow that He is a body; yet it is impossible for the beginningless Necessary Existent to be a body.

By their own agreement, this premise requires reasoning to establish, and each group among them challenges the others’ method. There are two principal methods used to establish it: the method of the Jahmiyyah and the Mu‘tazilah, and the method of the philosophers.

Those jurists and theologians, whether Ash‘arīs or others, who accept this premise merely follow either the Mu‘tazilah and the Jahmiyyah or the philosophers in this regard.

As for the Mu‘tazilah and the Jahmiyyah, their method is the argument from accidents and motions,