within the world nor outside it, even though they are connected with particular entities—indeed, you made them part of those particulars when you said, ‘The universal is part of the particular’—and you allow the existence of immaterial, intelligible souls that are neither within the world nor outside it, even though they are connected with human bodies by governing and directing them; and if, according to one of your two views, you also allow the existence of a celestial soul of this kind, then what prevents the Necessary Existent, while governing and directing the world, from being connected with it as souls are connected with bodies and universals with concrete particulars?

The Christians do not go so far as to say, ‘The divine nature is in the human nature as the soul is in the body.’ Rather, in their view, the divine nature is more separate from the human nature than the soul is from the body. Thus, if you allow something to be neither within the world nor outside it, while its connection with bodies is stronger than the connection between the divine and human natures according to the Christians, then it would be possible for the Necessary Existent to be connected with bodies—indeed, with all existing things—in the same way. The position of the Jahmiyyah, who say, ‘The divine nature is everywhere,’ would then be closer to what reason accepts than the position of those who say, ‘Immaterial entities are in bodies and concrete particulars.’”

What makes the matter clearer still is that these Peripatetic philosophers, along with the theologians and Sufis who agree with them, affirm five kinds of substance. One is the substance that can be perceived by the senses, which they call a body. The other four are intelligible substances that cannot be perceived by the senses. They are: the intellect,