If their brethren among those who deny Allah’s being above creation and separate from it say, “This is inconceivable,” they reply:

“If we present to reason the existence of a being that subsists in itself, yet is neither separate from the world nor co-located with it, neither within it nor outside it; and then present to reason the existence of a being within the world that subsists in itself, neither touches it nor is separate from it, and is neither a body nor something occupying space—or the existence of a being separate from the world that is neither a body nor something occupying space—the latter would be more acceptable to reason.”

For the existence of a being that cannot be pointed to and is not spatially delimited—neither a body nor a substance—is either possible or impossible. If it is impossible, the position of those who affirm a being that is neither within the world nor outside it, and cannot be pointed to, is invalid. In that case, the position of someone who affirms a being outside the world or within it, while saying that it cannot be pointed to, would be less irrational than this.

If, however, the existence of a being that cannot be pointed to and is neither a body nor something occupying space is rationally possible, then it is evident that additionally saying it is outside the world would not require that it be something that can be pointed to. Nor would it be a divisible body, or correspond to, be parallel to, or be aligned with the Throne; nor would it be larger, smaller, or equal to it.

If, alongside this, it is said to dwell within the world, it would not be permissible to say that it touches the world or is separate from it, because, in their view, contact and separateness are accidental properties of a body that can be pointed to. Thus, that which