The proponents of indwelling said to them:

“Your claim that conceivable indwelling entails the dependence of that which indwells upon its locus applies only when that which indwells is an accident—not when it is a body, much less when it is neither a body nor an accident. If, however, we suppose something that indwells but is neither a body nor an accident, why do you say that its indwelling entails dependence upon its locus?”

They also said to them:

“If you allow the existence of a being that is neither distinct from another nor indwelling in it, why should the existence of a being that indwells another without depending upon it not be possible?”

If you say, “We cannot conceive of anything indwelling something else without depending upon it,” you may be answered: “This is just like what you yourselves told those who affirm the divine attributes: ‘This is a judgment of thought and imagination,’ when they said, ‘We cannot conceive of an existent being except as either distinct from another or occupying the same place as it.’”

This is the very objection Ahmad reported from the Jahmīs when they said, “He is everywhere, neither in contact nor distinct.” Much less would they say that He is dependent, for dependence is conceivable only in the indwelling of accidents. When independently subsisting entities indwell other independently subsisting entities, dependence does not necessarily follow.

The proponents of indwelling maintain only that this is the indwelling of one entity in another, not the indwelling of an attribute in a locus.

For this reason, Imam Ahmad and others like him asked them: “Is He in contact or distinct?” When they denied both of these opposites, their contradiction of clear reason became evident. This argument against them was stronger than al-Rāzī’s argument, since he denied the indwelling of an accident in its locus, whereas no one had asserted this.