place,” argue against the negationists among them, who say, “He is neither separate from the world nor within it.” Their argument is: “We have agreed that He is not above the world. Once this is established, He must be within the world: either His existence is the very existence of the world, or He indwells the world, or He unites with it”—as is known from their doctrines.

Those Jahmiyyah who reject indwelling and union have no argument against these people except one of the same kind as the argument used against themselves by those who affirm. The latter say: “Whatever is neither within the world nor separate from it does not exist.” If they acknowledge the validity of this argument, their own position is invalidated. If they do not, their fellow Jahmiyyah who espouse indwelling can likewise refuse to acknowledge the validity of their argument, since both arguments are of the same kind.

[Al-Rāzī’s refutation of those who espouse indwelling]

Consider this in light of what al-Rāzī said in refuting those who espouse indwelling. In his discussion “of the impossibility of His essence or any of His attributes indwelling anything,” he mentioned that Christians sometimes affirm indwelling and sometimes union.

He said:

“Indwelling is invalid, for it is conceivable only if that which indwells depends upon that in which it dwells. If His indwelling is contingent, this negates the dependence of that which indwells upon that in which it dwells. If it is necessary, it entails the Necessary Being’s dependence upon something other than Himself, and either His having come into existence or the beginningless existence of that in which He dwells.”