or truths close to being self-evident. Certainty about them is greater than certainty that there exists a being that cannot be physically pointed to, and that the Necessary Existent cannot be pointed to because whatever can be pointed to is a body—so that, if He were pointed to, He would be a body, whereas He is not a body. These claims are either known to be false through self-evidence or reasoning, or, if they can be known at all, they can be known only through discursive methods. Thus they cannot be used to impugn those self-evident premises. Inference and reasoning are sometimes expressed in terms of universality and generality, and sometimes in terms of resemblance and analogy.

Likewise, when we say, “It must either subsist in itself or in another, be either eternal or originated, or be either necessary or contingent,” the same applies when we say, “It must either be distinct or present in the same locus, or be either inside or outside.”

Ibn Kullāb—and other leading rational thinkers—explained to these negators that, if they allowed the Lord to lack both of two opposed attributes—which they know no existent can lack—they would have to allow the same elsewhere and describe Him in all the other impossible ways. He said:

“If you describe Him as neither in contact nor distinct, while knowing that the existents familiar to you must be either in contact or distinct, then you have described Him in a way that you yourselves regard as impossible for the existents you know. You must therefore describe Him in similarly impossible ways, saying that He is neither eternal nor originated, neither subsisting in Himself nor in another, neither living nor dead, neither knowledgeable nor ignorant, and so forth.”

He also mentioned another, fourth argument, saying:

“Is it not said of what has no existence