Or else you say: “I do not know what the term ‘body’ means.”

Or you say: “The term ‘body’ is ambiguous and imprecise. If you mean a body in the ordinary linguistic sense, namely the human body, I do not concede that I know of no living being endowed with knowledge and power except something resembling the human body. For the soul, too, possesses life, knowledge, and power, yet it is not of the same kind as the body. The same applies to angels and others.”

If by “body” you mean something susceptible to separation, division, and partition, such that its parts can actually become detached from one another, the reply is:

“I can conceive of an existent being endowed with knowledge and power before knowing whether it can be separated and partitioned. Thus, my conception of a living existent being endowed with knowledge and power does not entail that it is susceptible to such separation and partition.”

If by “body” you mean something that can be physically pointed to, I do not consider this impossible. Rather, I consider it necessary; for if something cannot be pointed to, it does not exist.

If by “body” you mean something that can be composed of indivisible, sense-perceptible substances, or of matter and form, which are regarded as two intelligible substances, I do not consider any body to be constituted in this way, let alone entertain such a supposition. If I deny this of simple created beings, then it is all the more fitting to affirm that the Lord of the worlds is free of it.

If by “partition” you mean that something of Him can be seen while something else is not—as Ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Ikrima, and others among the early generations made statements consistent with this—I do not concede to you that this is impossible.