both sides of the contradiction. He must also liken Him to impossible and nonexistent things. Thus, whenever he seeks to escape one objectionable consequence, he falls into something worse.”

[The third ground]

It may be said to the one who denies both separation and indwelling:

“You describe Him as existent, self-subsisting, eternal, living, all-knowing, and all-powerful, yet you know of no existent being with these attributes except a body.

“You must therefore adopt one of two positions.

“Either you say, ‘He is existent, living, all-knowing, and eternal, but He is not a body.’

“You are then told: ‘He likewise possesses life, knowledge, and power, but He is not a body.’ You are also told: ‘He is separate from the world and above it, but He is not a body.’

“If you say, ‘Being separate from the world and above it necessarily means that He is a body, because I can conceive of separation and being in the same place only as attributes of bodies,’ you are told:

“‘Being living, all-knowing, and all-powerful must likewise mean that He is a body, because you can conceive of no existent being that is living, all-knowing, and all-powerful except a body. The two cases are analogous. Whatever you say about one commits you to saying the equivalent about the other; otherwise, you contradict yourself by treating like cases differently.’

“Or you say: ‘I affirm that He is existent, self-subsisting, living, all-knowing, and all-powerful because this is known through revelation and reason. Even if this necessarily means that He is a body, I accept that consequence, because a necessary consequence of the truth is itself true.’

“You are told:

“‘The same is said by one who affirms that He is above the world and separate from it: “I describe Him in these terms because this has been established through revelation and reason. If this necessarily means that He is a body, I accept that consequence, because a necessary consequence of the truth is itself true.”’