is more perfect than an inanimate thing incapable of possessing either attribute. An inanimate body is better than nonexistence, which is neither separate from anything else nor within it, neither eternal nor brought into existence, and neither necessary nor contingent. Thus, you have described Him in terms applicable only to what is more deficient than anything deficient.”

[The second ground]

It may be said:

“Your statement, ‘These are attributes of bodies,’ is ambiguous.

If you mean that these attributes can belong only to beings of the same kind as created things, and that ascribing them to the Lord would necessarily make Him of the same kind as existing things and like them, then this is false. You do not know that only a created being can possess these attributes, for this is the very question at issue. If you could demonstrate that only a created being can possess them, you would have no need of this argument.

You are told: ‘You have no way to establish this negation, and no evidence supports it.’

If you say, ‘These attributes are ascribed to created beings and to bodies,’ you are answered:

‘Yes. But the fact that created bodies possess these attributes does not prevent the Lord from possessing attributes of this kind in a manner befitting Him. Examples include being described as existent, established, real, and self-subsisting, and similar descriptions. All these descriptions also apply to created bodies.’

If he consistently applies his analogy, it necessarily leads to outright heresy and Qarmatianism, and to denying both sides of a contradiction. He would then say: ‘He is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither established nor negated, neither real nor unreal, and neither subsisting in Himself nor in another.’ This is the necessary consequence of the position of anyone who denies the attributes. He must then either affirm both sides of a contradiction, or deny