that establish this are not conceded by it. Indeed, it cannot concede anything that entails the contrary, for that would mean undermining self-evident truths by means of inferential arguments.

Moreover, according to them, the estimative faculty apprehends only particular meanings, whereas these propositions are universal; they therefore cannot be propositions of the estimative faculty.

Furthermore, the propositions used to establish the existence of these beings are sophistical, as has been explained elsewhere.

As for his statement:

“These propositions of the estimative faculty would be widely accepted were religious teachings not opposed to them. It is only true religions and the philosophical sciences that diminish their widespread acceptance.”

The reply to him is:

This is among the clearest proofs of their soundness. These propositions are widely accepted among all peoples whose innate disposition has not been altered, and among all peoples who follow the ways of the prophets—peace and blessings be upon them—including Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Only religious innovators, such as the Mu'tazilah and their like, challenge them.

Since Ibn Sīnā was a follower of the esotericist Qarmatians and kept company with religious innovators among the Rāfidah and Mu'tazilah, or with those who shared some of these tendencies,