the case that they existed in the same manner as sensible things. Thus, that mode of existence could not be represented in the estimative faculty. For this reason, the estimative faculty assists the intellect with the premises that establish the existence of those principles; but when they proceed together to the conclusion, the estimative faculty recoils and refuses to accept what follows from the premises it has conceded.

This kind of proposition has greater force in the soul than widely accepted propositions that are not primary self-evident truths. Such propositions almost resemble primary truths and fall within the category of propositions resembling them. They are judgments made by the soul about things prior to sensible things, or more general than them, in a manner that ought not to apply to those things, yet corresponds to what must apply—or is thought to apply—to sensible things. Examples include the belief that there must be a void at which occupied space ends, if it is finite, and that, for every existing thing, one must be able to point towards the direction in which it exists.”

The reply to him is:

This argument would be valid only if the existence of things imperceptible to the senses were established, so that these judgments would concern what is prior to sensible things, or more general than them. Yet the existence of such things can be established only if their existence is shown to be possible; and that possibility can be established only if the propositions he calls propositions of the estimative faculty are shown to be false. Thus, refuting these propositions by establishing the existence of such things would entail circular reasoning. For these propositions judge it impossible for anything to exist that cannot be pointed to, and the premises