—which is universal—he points to that instance.

The particulars falling under universal propositions sometimes exist in external reality, and sometimes are merely conceived in the mind, with no concrete existence. This is often a source of error and confusion.

The primary aim of knowledge is simply to know what exists in external reality. Mental constructs, however, depend on whatever conceptions occur to people, whether true or false. Upon careful reflection and consideration, we show that what these proponents of negation affirm—an existent that cannot be pointed to and is neither inside the world nor outside it—is a mental construct, not a concrete existent.

Logicians other than Ibn Sīnā and his followers, such as Abū al-Barakāt, author of al-Mu'tabar, and others, did not exclude these propositions, which Ibn Sīnā called “estimative propositions,” from the category of self-evident first principles, as Ibn Sīnā did. Nor do I think Aristotle, the author of the Logic, excluded them either.

As for his statement:

“This kind of proposition has a stronger hold on the soul than