pair of existent things must be such that one is either separate from the other or co-located with it, just as it is this same faculty that judges that, for every pair of existent things, the existence of one must either coincide with or precede that of the other, and that everything that exists must subsist either in itself or in something else.

If you call these universal propositions estimative, then intellectual judgments are themselves estimative judgments. If you call them intellectual and suppose that they contradict one another, then intellectual judgments necessarily contradict one another.

Know that these thinkers may offer an answer that could be used to answer anyone who challenges universal intellectual judgments.

As for your statement:

“When both proceed together to the conclusion, the estimative faculty recoils,”

you may be asked: What is this estimative faculty that recoils? Is it what you have termed the estimative faculty? That faculty conceives only particular meanings; it makes no judgment concerning universals, whether to accept or reject them. Thus, one cannot say of it that it neither accepts nor recoils, just as one cannot say, concerning universal propositions, that sensory perception accepts them and does not reject them, or that sight distinguishes between sounds and hearing distinguishes between colors.

And if you say:

“The intellect establishes a particular existent that cannot be pointed to, whereas the estimative faculty cannot conceive of a particular thing that cannot be pointed to.”