in actuality, as well as what can be perceived by the senses. There is no doubt that things actually perceived by the senses have principles that are not perceived by the senses.

But why do you say that everything that can be perceived by the senses has a principle that cannot be perceived by the senses? This merely states the doctrine.

As for his statement:

“For this reason, the estimative faculty assists the intellect in the premises that establish the existence of those principles. Yet when both proceed together to the conclusion, the estimative faculty recoils and refuses to accept what follows from the grounds it has conceded,”

this is not conceded.

It has already been shown that his arguments for establishing this are of the same kind as those by which he established intelligible entities existing in external reality through establishing universals. This is like his proof of what exists outside the mind.

He may then be told: As for the estimative faculty that assists the intellect, if you mean what you have called estimation—the faculty that apprehends, in particular sensible things, meanings not perceived by the senses, such as friendship and enmity—then these conceptions contain no premise that helps establish an existent that cannot be perceived by the senses. Indeed, those premises, such as establishing universals and the like, contain no premise apprehended by this estimative faculty.

If, however, by the assisting estimative faculty you mean that which makes universal judgments, such as the mind’s judgment that this human being and that human being share a common humanity, and the like, then these are judgments of the intellect, not of the estimative faculty.

Furthermore, the faculty that judges that an unqualified humanity exists is the same faculty that judges that every