be perceived by the senses, this is not conceded. It is the central issue, and he has offered no proof for it.

In his al-Ishārāt (Remarks), he offered no evidence for this beyond what al-Rāzī and others like him have mentioned. He said:

“On Existence and Its Causes: People often imagine that whatever exists is perceptible to the senses; that anything whose substance cannot be apprehended by the senses cannot possibly be supposed to exist; and that whatever is not confined to a place or situated either in itself, like a body, or by virtue of that in which it inheres, like the states of a body, has no share in being and no existence.”

He said:

“You can reflect upon sensible things themselves and thereby recognize the falsity of these people’s claim. For both you and anyone fit to be addressed know that a single name may apply to these sensible things, not through pure equivocation, but in accordance with one and the same meaning. Such is the name ‘human being’: neither of you doubts that it applies to Zayd and ʿAmr in accordance with one and the same existing meaning.

“That existing meaning must either be accessible to the senses or not.

“If it lies beyond the reach of the senses, investigation has brought forth from sensible things something that is not sensible, and this