He may be told:

This argument assumes that sensible things have principles that cannot be apprehended by the senses. Yet this is the central issue and the very first point in dispute. If you use this as an argument to establish your conclusion, you have begged the question.

You may then be told:

According to you, estimation applies only to particulars, whereas these propositions are universal, not particular.

You may also be told:

The very same objection applies to your division of existence into that which subsists in itself and that which subsists in another, the eternal and the originated, substance and accident, cause and effect, and so forth. What you have said about those propositions applies to these as well.

You may further be asked what you mean by saying:

“If sensible things have principles and foundations, these would be prior to sensible things.”

Do you mean that what we have perceived has principles and foundations that we have not perceived? Or do you mean that whatever can be perceived by the senses must have a principle that cannot be perceived by them?

If you mean the former, that is conceded. But our not having perceived them does not entail that perceiving them is impossible. No rational person says that everything we do not witness now is something we cannot witness after death or at some other time. Every rational person allows that there may be things above the celestial spheres that we do not witness now. Indeed, there may be spheres and stars there that we do not perceive, let alone other things.

If, however, he says that everything that can be perceived by the senses must have a principle that cannot