according to them, then universal propositions may also be false if, according to them, their starting point derives from sense perception.

Thus, if someone were to say, “A being not perceived by the senses may be neither necessary nor possible, neither eternal nor originated, and neither subsisting in itself nor subsisting in another,” this would be equivalent to saying, “It may be neither separate from another nor co-located with it, neither within it nor outside it.”

If the latter speaker may be told, “These are estimative propositions, and estimation follows sense perception,” then the former may likewise be told, “These too are estimative propositions.” Alternatively, one may say, “They are sensory propositions, and the judgments of sense perception and estimation are accepted only concerning sensible things. They therefore cannot judge existence in general and its concomitants, since these are intelligible rather than sensible.” Whatever grounds are used to reject those universal propositions may equally be invoked against comparable universal propositions encompassing all beings and all objects of knowledge.

As for his statement intended to show that these propositions are false:

“It is known that if sensible things have principles and foundations, these would be prior to sensible things and would not themselves be sensible. Their existence would not be of the same kind as the existence of sensible things, and so that existence could not be represented in estimation.”