just, generous, merciful, and courageous, and that another is unjust, miserly, hard-hearted, and cowardly, is, according to their terminology, estimation. For this is the apprehension of imperceptible qualities in perceptible things.

The same applies to all other moral qualities for which people are praised or censured, such as righteousness, wickedness, chastity, truthfulness, falsehood, nobility, baseness, and the like. These are qualities that exist in a perceptible person, but the moral qualities themselves are not perceptible. Only the outward actions arising from them are perceived through the senses, just as the outward actions arising from friendship and enmity are perceived.

It is well known that apprehending these matters falls within what people of sound reason generally call reason, knowledge, and understanding. Indeed, recognizing what is right as right and what is wrong as wrong also falls within (estimation) according to their terminology. For what is right is what is loved, agreeable, and fitting, whereas what is wrong is what is disliked, contrary, and incompatible. The faculty through which these meanings are apprehended in sensible things is estimation. Indeed, according to their account, every meaning apprehended in perceptible individual things is apprehended through estimation. In such cases, no distinction remains between estimative and rational apprehensions except that the former are particular and the latter universal.

It is well known that apprehending many of these meanings is distinctive to reason. This is illustrated by the fact that, when a man sees his wife with someone whom he suspects of wrongdoing, this is the apprehension of something