and similarly, a male goat perceives the form of a sheep, and a person perceives the identifying signs of his friend and enemy. For example, each of two warring groups perceives the other’s identifying signs, whether audible, such as their rallying cries, or visible, such as their banners. These too are perceived through the senses and used to infer friendship and hostility, which are not themselves perceptible but exist in perceptible individuals.

In short, they do not stipulate that an estimative representation must be apprehended by estimation without the mediation of anything perceptible. Rather, these meanings are apprehended only in perceptible things, and those perceptible things must themselves be apprehended. Estimation must therefore accompany sense perception. This is indispensable; otherwise, if estimation apprehended its objects independently of sense perception, it would apprehend them apart from perceptible concrete things. One must therefore apprehend, through one’s inward faculty—which they call estimation—and one’s outward faculty, namely the senses, both the inward aspect of the object apprehended—the meaning, such as friendship or hostility—and its outward aspect, namely the individual in whom that meaning inheres.

Accordingly, the inclination of each kind toward what inwardly accords with it results from this faculty’s apprehension, as occurs among those who love or hate one another. Those who love one another may do so because they cooperate in securing what benefits them and warding off what harms them, as is found among soldiers in an army, inhabitants of the same city, adherents of the same religion, people of the same lineage, and the like.