Given this, it may be said: if they define (estimation) as conceiving of a meaning that is not perceptible in perceptible concrete things and is not conveyed through the senses, then clearly this includes every internal attribute inhering in a living being: power, will, love, hatred, desire, anger, and the like.

For power in one who possesses it is like hostility in an enemy and friendship in a friend. Indeed, friendship, hostility, love, and hatred may be more readily apparent to the external senses than power.

On this basis, conceiving of being owned and of ownership also falls within estimation. For conceiving of a particular person as belonging to another or as owning another is conceiving of a meaning in a perceptible person; yet that meaning is not itself perceptible, nor is it imagined in the way perceptible things are imagined.

Likewise, conceiving of desire and aversion also falls under estimative conception in their terminology. Conceiving of pain and pleasure in another falls into the same category, for the pleasure and pain an animal experiences within itself are not perceptible to the senses.

If it is said, “These things are apprehended through effects that become apparent, and the senses perceive those outward manifestations; hence they should not be described as apprehended through estimation,” the reply is: if this suffices, then clearly a sheep’s conception of the perceptible form of a wolf is an apprehension of that form, and that form entails hostility,