It is thus clear that this faculty apprehends meanings that are neither perceptible to the senses nor conveyed through them. He therefore distinguished it from the sensory and imaginative faculties on the grounds that the imaginative faculty apprehends what is conveyed through the senses.

The commentators explained the import of his words, saying:

“This establishes the existence of the estimative and retentive faculties. The estimative faculty is a power by which an animal apprehends particular meanings that have not been conveyed to it through the senses, such as hostility, friendship, compatibility, and incompatibility in particular individuals. The apprehension of these meanings demonstrates the existence of a faculty that apprehends them. Their not being conveyed through the senses demonstrates that this faculty is distinct from the faculty of common sense; and its presence in non-rational animals demonstrates that it is distinct from the rational soul.”

They said:

“This may also be demonstrated by the fact that a person sometimes fears something that his intellect tells him he is safe from, such as the dead. Whatever conflicts with his intellect is distinct from his intellect.”

Ibn Sīnā said in his al-Ishārāt (The Pointers):

“Everything in which pleasure is taken causes the perceiver to attain a perfection that is good in relation to that perceiver. There is, moreover, no doubt that perfections and the apprehension of them vary in degree. The perfection of appetite, for example, consists in the organ’s acquiring