at times, and in the sense of supposition at other times. He does not report that it is used to mean certainty, whereas they use it for a certain conception: the conception of meanings that are not perceptible to the senses but whose existence is beyond doubt, such as the wolf’s hostility towards the ewe and the ram’s friendliness towards her.

In Arabic, one speaks of these meanings by saying, “I conceived them, knew them, ascertained them, became certain of them, and discerned them,” and similar expressions denoting knowledge. One does not say, “I formed a supposition about them,” except when they are not known. Their terminology therefore runs counter to established Arabic usage—indeed, to usage in all other languages.

Accordingly, the sound apprehension that they call estimation and imagination is a kind of conception, awareness, and knowledge.

[Ibn Sīnā’s discussion establishing the estimative faculty, and Ibn Taymiyyah’s comments on it]

This is illustrated by what they said in establishing the estimative faculty. As Ibn Sīnā said:

“Animals, rational and non-rational alike, apprehend in particular sensible things particular meanings that are neither perceptible to the senses nor conveyed through them. Examples include a sheep’s apprehension of a meaning in a wolf that is not perceptible to the senses, and a ram’s apprehension of a meaning in a ewe that is not perceptible to the senses. This is a particular apprehension on which the animal bases its judgments, just as sense judges what it observes. Thus, you possess a faculty whose function is this. Many non-rational animals also possess a faculty that retains these meanings after the judging faculty has passed judgment on them, distinct from the faculty that retains images.”