Thus, this universal proposition is intellectual, even though it is a judgment concerning matters apprehended by estimation and imagination.

Likewise, if you say, “Every friendship is the opposite of enmity,” this is a judgment about the intellect’s conception of all the individual instances apprehended by estimation.

Similarly, if we say, “Everything perceptible to the senses is particular,” this is a universal intellectual proposition encompassing everything apprehended by the senses. It is well known that the more general a judgment is, the closer it is to the intellect.

Our statements, “Every existing thing that subsists in itself can be pointed to,” and “Any two existing things must be either separate or co-located,” are among the most general and comprehensive propositions. How, then, can they belong to the apprehensions of estimation, which can only be particular?

Accordingly, their statement, “The judgment of estimation and imagination may contradict the judgment of the intellect,” is equivalent to saying, “The judgment of sense perception may contradict the judgment of the intellect,” or, “The judgment of the intellect contradicts the judgment of the intellect.” We are not discussing sense perception, estimation, imagination, or the intellect when impaired by some defect, for there is no doubt that their judgments can then contradict one another. Rather, we are discussing sense perception as such and its attendant faculties, which they call estimation and imagination.

[Another Passage by Ibn Sīnā in al-Ishārāt (The Pointers)]

Ibn Sīnā also said in his discussion of the stations of the gnostics:

“The first stage in the movements of the gnostics is what they themselves call volition. This is what comes over one who has attained insight