If, however, he means that what he calls estimation and imagination makes a universal judgment that contradicts a universal judgment of the intellect—and this is what they mean—then they are contradicting themselves. For they have explained the judgment of estimation, which they regard as contradicting the intellect, as a universal judgment that contradicts a universal judgment known through the intellect. For example, it judges that there is no existing thing that cannot be pointed to, and that, of any two existing things, one must be either co-located with or separate from the other. It also rules out the existence of anything neither within the world nor outside it, and makes other judgments of this kind.

They may therefore be told:

These are universal propositions and general judgments. Yet you have said that estimation apprehends, in particular sensible things, particular meanings that are neither perceptible to the senses nor conveyed through them. An example is its apprehension of friendship and enmity in particular instances, on which it bases judgments just as sense perception judges what we observe.

Likewise, according to you, imagination retains the conceptions it forms of particular sensible things. Thus, if estimation and imagination apprehend only particulars, just as sense perception does, while these propositions that you claim conflict with the judgment of the intellect are universal propositions, it follows that these do not belong to the apprehensions of estimation and imagination, any more than they belong to those of sense perception. Rather, they are universal intellectual propositions, like other universal intellectual propositions. They cannot evade this conclusion. It is comparable to the judgment that all estimation and imagination apprehend only particulars.