so their seeking it when they see it implies that they have recognized it as resembling the first. They can recognize such resemblance only if the soul contains a form corresponding to both similar things, by which their resemblance is discerned.

But it may be said:

In that case, there is no difference between imagination and intellectual apprehension insofar as either may be particular or unrestricted. In neither case is its content itself identical with what exists in the intellect; rather, it is its likeness.

As for his statement:

“as though it had acted upon the object of sensation and made it intelligible,”

what actually occurs is that nothing has been done to the object of sensation at all, nor is there anything intelligible within it. Rather, the intellect has formed an intelligible representation corresponding to that object and others like it.

As for his statement:

“As for what is intrinsically free of material admixtures and of extraneous attributes that do not necessarily belong to its essence by virtue of that essence, it is intelligible in itself,”

there are two points to make.

First, it may be said: Establishing such an intelligible depends on establishing the intelligible abstracted from the object of sensation. Yet the latter exists only in the intellect, not externally. The abstract intelligible would therefore be likewise. Hence, nothing in this entails that an abstract intelligible exists externally.

Second, it may be said: Establishing that these abstract intelligibles exist externally depends on their existence being possible; and the possibility of their existence rests on the possibility of the existence of something that cannot be