As for his statement:

“As for internal imagination, it imagines it together with those incidental attributes and cannot abstract it completely from them. It does, however, abstract it from the aforementioned relation to which sensory perception was tied. It thus represents its form in the absence of its bearer.”

The reply is: This is an argument against you. What a person imagines within himself exists only within himself. The imagined form does not exist in the external world, nor does imagining something require that the thing imagined exist externally.

Your statement, “It imagines it together with those incidental attributes,” asserts the existence of two things, yet this has no basis in reality. He has imagined nothing but the form, which is an accident subsisting within himself.

Your statement, “It thus represents its form in the absence of its bearer,” is ambiguous. The form he imagines within himself has no bearer in the external world, whereas the bearer of the external form exists together with it. Thus, the form borne in the external world is not identical to what is within himself, and what is within himself is not the form that is borne.

More precisely, he imagines the form while it is entirely absent from his external senses, never with its bearer absent—whether by “form” one means the individual itself that is envisaged or the shape itself inhering in it.

And his statement: “Imagination imagines it together with those incidental attributes and is unable to