every particular individual many universals, the conception of which does not preclude their being shared by many. Thus, in every particular human being there would be a universal animal, a universal rational being, a universal human being, a universal body, a universal sentient being, a universal self-subsisting being, a universal substance, a universal existent, a universal created being, a universal eater, a universal drinker, a universal breather, and other such descriptions applicable to a human being.

Sound reason plainly establishes that a universal which may encompass many particulars cannot be part of a single particular. For the many cannot be a portion or a part of the few; nor can something that encompasses, includes, and extends to many things—or is capable of doing so—be part of a single thing that admits neither universality nor being shared by many.

As for his statement:

“Sense apprehends it insofar as it is immersed in these accidents that attach to it because of the matter from which it was created. Sense does not strip it of them, and apprehends it only through a positional relation.”

The response is that this rests on the assumption that something exists externally within this particular human being, and that this particular human being has accrued to it as an accident. This is a wilful denial of sensory perception and reason.

The matter from which his body was created no longer exists; rather, it has undergone transformation and ceased to exist. There is no semen in him at all now.

His statement, “Sense does not strip it of them,” would be valid only if there were some existing matter distinct from this observable body, so that one could be abstracted with respect to the other.

Certainly, if by matter he means the body, and means that the soul is conjoined to the body, then this is correct.