you imagined another in its place, this would not alter the true essence of his humanity.

Sensation apprehends it as immersed in these accidental attributes, which attach to it because of the matter from which it was created. It does not strip them away, and apprehends it only through a spatial relation between the sense faculty and its matter. Thus, when it is no longer present, only its outward form is represented in sensation.

Inward imagination, by contrast, imagines it together with those accidental attributes. It cannot abstract it entirely from them, but it does abstract it from the aforementioned relation on which sensation depends. It therefore represents its form even in the absence of that which bears it.

The intellect, however, can abstract the essence enveloped in extraneous, individuating concomitants, firmly apprehending that essence, as though it had performed an operation upon the sensible object that rendered it intelligible.

As for that which is in itself free of material admixtures and of concomitants