and judgments of estimation.

The propositions that must be accepted are self-evident propositions, propositions established by observation, propositions established by experience and the associated classes of intuitive propositions, propositions established by mass transmission, and propositions whose syllogisms accompany them.”

He discussed the propositions that must be accepted in a manner that need not be reproduced here. The flaws in their Greek logic have been discussed at length—for example, their distinctions among essential attributes inseparable from an essence; their claim that a real definition imparts knowledge of an essence, and that real natures are composed of genera and differentiae; their discussion of the five predicables and the premises of demonstration; their claim that acquired conceptions can be attained only through their form of definition, and acquired judgments only through a syllogism of their kind; and other matters that do not belong here.

The point here is that he said:

“As for propositions based purely on estimation, they are false propositions. Yet the human faculty of estimation affirms them with tremendous force, for it does not accept their contraries or opposites. This is because estimation follows sensory perception: whatever does not accord with what is perceptible to the senses is not accepted by estimation. It is known that if sensible things have principles and foundations, these would precede sensible things and would not themselves be sensible, nor would their existence be of the same kind as the existence of sensible things. Thus, it would not be possible to represent that